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1. Introduction 
The  legislative  procedures  of the  European  Union  (EU)  have  been  the  object  of 
considerable attention during the past years. The literature includes theoretical analyses of 
the  procedures,  amongst others  by  Tsebelis  (1994),  Steunenberg  (1994)  and  Crombez 
(1996,  1997a).  In  these  models  the  Commission,  the  Parliament  and  the  member 
countries consider specific policy issues and do  not engage in vote trading across policy 
issues.  Equilibrium  EU  policies  depend  on  the  preferences  of the  Commission,  the 
Parliament and the countries, and these preferences are assumed to be exogenous. 
Crombez  (1997b) analyzes one of the elements that shape the preferences of one of the 
institutions. In particular, it endogenizes the Commission's preferences by studying the 
Commission appointment process. It characterizes  sets  of effective  Commissions,  i.e., 
Commissions that can be appointed and can successfully propose their own ideal policies, 
and sets of successful proposals, i.e., proposals that can become EU policy, as a function 
of  the ideal policies of  the countries and the Parliament. 
This paper builds on that work to  study vote trading  in EU  policy making. It analyzes 
whether the Commission appointment and policy making processes allow for logrolling 
and  characterizes  sets  of sustainable logrolls,  i.e.,  logrolls  that can become EU policy 
during the policy making process.  Logrolling in the  EU has  received little attention in 
2 literature sofar.  Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994) discuss cooperative and non-
cooperative theories oflogrolling and apply them to the EU. Carrubba and Volden (1996) 
present a distributive model of vote trading and also  analyze the EU.  They study how 
chamber size and voting rule affect a legislature's ability to engage in logrolling, and find 
that larger legislative bodies choose less restricitve voting rules to facilitate logrolling. 
I present a spatial model of Commission appointment, EU policy making and logrolling, 
and assume that the countries and the Parliament have Euclidean preferences over an n-
dimensional policy space, i.e., they each have an ideal policy and they prefer policies that 
are closer to, rather than farther away from,  their ideal policies. The countries and the 
Parliament decide on an EU Commission and an EU policy in a sequential game with 
complete and perfect information. First, they choose a Commission. Subsequently, they 
choose  an EU policy together with the Commission.  They have preferences  over EU 
policy and care about the Commission only because it affects EU policy. Therefore, they 
think ahead and look at the policy making process when they appoint a Commission. 
Whether they vote in favor of the Commission depends on the policy they expect it to 
implement. This policy can imply logrolling: the countries and the Parliament can vote 
against their preferences on some policy issues  in return for  others'  support  on other 
issues. 
3 In the next section I introduce the model. The third section considers policy making on 
individual  policy  issues  and  characterizes  the  sets  of  successful  proposals,  i.e., 
Commission proposals that can become EU policy in the absence of logrolling, under the 
two principal legislative procedures: the consultation and co-decision procedures.  1 These 
sets  are  functions  of the  ideal  policies  of the  countries  and  the  Parliament,  and  the 
location of the status quo.  In the fourth section I consider Commission appointment and 
logrolling, and characterize the sets of effective Commissions, i.e., Commissions that can 
be  appointed  and  can  successfully  propose  their  own  ideal  policies,  and  the  sets  of 
sustainable logrolls,  i.e., logrolls that can become EU policy during the policy making 
process. The fifth section presents the conclusions. The Commission is  found to  be  an 
institution that  facilitates  logrolling.  By appointing  a  Commission prior to  the  policy 
making process the countries can commit to  a particular logrol!.  All  countries and the 
Parliament prefer the logroll to the status quo. 
2. The Model 
I present a spatial model of Commission appointment, EU policy making and logrolling. 
Alternative EU policies are represented by points in an n-dimensional policy space. Each 
dimension corresponds to a specific policy issue, such as the allowable noncocoa fat level 
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in chocolate or the length of  daylight saving time. EU policy making can then be thought 
of  as choosing a point in the policy space. 
I assume that countries have Euclidean preferences  over the EU  policy  p(p),  ... , p") , 
with  ideal  policy  P  k (p  k ) ,. •• , P  /'  )  for  country  k.  I  refer  to  the  EU  policy  i  on 
dimension i as the i-policy, and to country k's ideal policy p/ on dimension i as country 
k's ideal  i-policy.2  Parliamentarians and  potential  Commissioners are  also  assumed to 
have Euclidean preferences over EU policy. 
First the countries, as represented in the Council, and the Parliament form a Commission. 
When  the  Commission  is  formed,  the  Commission,  the  Parliament and  the  countries 
together  decide  on an  EU  policy.  For the  policy  making  process  I  consider the  two 
principal legislative procedures: the consultation and co-decision procedures. 
The Commission appointment process, as studied in the model, is shown in Figure  1. It 
was analyzed in more detail by  Crombez (1997b).  In the first  stage Nature selects the 
country k that is to  propose a Commission President.  Country k's selection probability 
could, for example, be equal to its share of  Commissioners.3 In the third and fourth stages 
the  countries  and  the  Parliament  vote  on the  proposed  Commission  President.  If all 
countries  and  the  Parliament  vote  in  favor,  the  proposed  Commission  President  is 
appointed and subsequently appoints the  other Commissioners.4  Otherwise,  the  status 
quo prevails. The status quo is either the policy agreed on under a previous Commission, 
5 or the result of existing national policies. On the daylight saving time issue, for example, 
the status quo would be daylight saving time from the last weekend of March until the 
last weekend of October. On the chocolate issue, the status quo would be the absence of 
an internal market. 
-----Figure 1 about here-----
After  the  appointment  of the  Commission  the  countries  and  institutions  tum  their 
attention to policy making. I assume that n policy issues arise during the Commission's 
term and that the countries and institutions deal with these n policy issues one issue at a 
time.  Since the countries, the  Parliamentarians and the  Commissioners have  Euclidean 
preferences,  their preferences over the  i-policy are  independent of the  EU policies  on 
other dimensions. Country k's utility, for example, decreases as the i-policy moves farther 
away  from  country  k's  ideal  i-policy  p/,  whatever  the  EU  policies  on  the  other 
dimensions are. In the absence of logrolling EU policy making on dimension i can thus 
be studied as if  it were the only relevant dimension. 
The  Commission  and  the  Parliament  use  simple  majority  rule,  and  there  are  no 
restrictions  on  amendments.  As  a  consequence,  the  analysis  of policy  making  on 
dimension  i  can  be  simplified  by  focusing  on  the  ideal  i-policies  of the  i-median 
Commissioner and the i-median Parliamentarian.  Suppose the  i-status quo  qi  is  to  the 
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right  (left)  of  the  i-median  Commissioner's  ideal  i-policy  fJ/.  The  i-median 
Commissioner and all  Commissioners on his  left (right) then want a move to  the  left 
(right).  As  a result,  any  i-policy  is  defeated  in the  Commission by  i-policies  that are 
closer to the i-median Commissioner's ideal i-policy. Similar reasoning applies to voting 
in the Parliament. With respect to policy making on dimension i the Commission and the 
Parliament can thus  be treated as  unitary actors  with ideal  i-policies  equal  to  their  i-
median voters' ideal policies, fJ/  and fJ/  respectively.5 
The Council is not represented as a unitary actor because it uses qualified majority rule. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of policy making on dimension i can be simplified by focusing 
on the countries that are i-pivotal under the qualified majority rule. To  defeat the status 
quo 62 out of a total of 87 votes are needed.6 The country  ai  that is i-pivotal for a move 
to the right thus has an ideal policy to the left of the country with the i-median vote. In 
particular, country  ai  is the country with the 26th vote (from the left).  Country  a i  and 
the countries to its right then have 62 votes, and the countries to its right do not constitute 
a qualified majority without country ai . The country bi  that is i-pivotal for a move to the 
left is the country with the 62nd vote. 
Policy  making  on  dimension  i  starts  with  a  proposal  from  the  Commission.  The 
Commission proposal goes through one of the EU's legislative procedures.  The model 
focuses  on  the  consultation  and  co-decision  procedures.  Crombez  (1996)  presents  a 
7 model  of the  consultation  procedure,  and  Crombez  (1997a)  studies  the  co-decision 
procedure. This model uses simplified versions of  those models. 
The  consultation procedure  is  shown  in Figure  2.  First,  the  Commission proposes  a 
policy. Next, the countries vote on the Commission proposal in the Council. The proposal 
is  adopted if a  qualified majority in the  Council supports it.  If the proposal does  not 
obtain a qualified majority, the status quo prevails.? 
----- Figure 2 about here-----
The  co-decision procedure  is  shown  in Figure  3.  In the  first  stage  the  Commission 
proposes a policy. In the second stage the Parliament can offer a joint text.s If  the Council 
accepts the joint text by a qualified majority in the third stage, the joint text becomes ED 
policy.  If the  Parliament does  not propose  a joint text or the  Council  rejects  it,  the 
Parliament  votes  on the  Commission  proposal  in the  fourth  stage.  If the  Parliament 
accepts the proposal and the Council confirms it by a qualified majority in the final stage, 
then the proposal becomes ED policy. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. 
----- Figure 3 about here-----
The model incorporates complete and perfect information.9 The countries, the Parliament 
and the Commission know each other's preferences, the location of the status quo, the 
impact of proposed policies, the sequential structure of the model, and the actions taken 
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in prior stages of the model. They know which issues they will be addressing during the 
Commission's term. I 0 
An  equilibrium  consists  of a  strategy  for  each  country,  the  Parliament  and  the 
Commission.  Strategies  tell  the  countries,  the  Parliament  and  the  Commission  what 
actions to choose in the relevant stages of the procedure, given the actions taken in prior 
stages.  The  equilibrium concept  is  subgame  perfect Nash.  In  a Nash  equilibrium,  no 
country or institution can increase its utility by choosing another strategy, given the other 
countries' and institutions' strategies. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, countries 
and  institutions  can  do  no  better  than  stick  to  their  strategies  in  any  stage  of the 
procedure, even if  a country or institution deviated from its strategy in a prior stage. 
3. Policy Making 
In this  section I characterize the  sets  of successful  proposals  and the  equilibrium EU 
policies for any configuration of ideal policies and for any location of the status quo in 
the absence of logrolling. I study the consultation and co-decision procedures. For each 
procedure I first  look at  policy making on a single dimension  i.  As  mentioned above, 
policy making on dimension i can be studied as if it were the only relevant dimension. I 
go  through the different steps of the  procedure, and determine the  set of successful  i-
9 " 
proposals and the equilibrium i-policy. Subsequently, I look at the entire policy space and 
characterize  the  set of successful  proposals  and  the  equilibrium  EU  policy  in the  n-
dimensional policy space. 
3.1 Policy Making under the Consultation Procedure 
The Commission starts policy making on dimension i by proposing an  i-policy  pi, as 
shown in Figure 2.  It wants the i-policy to  be  as  close to  its  ideal i-policy as possible. 
This  does  not  imply,  however,  that the  Commission  proposes  its  ideal  i-policy.  The 
Commission understands the role the Council plays in the next stage of  the procedure and 
takes this into account when it makes its proposal. It  thinks ahead and looks at the second 
stage to  find  out which proposals  will  be  successful.  In equilibrium the  Commission 
proposal is thus based on its expectations about what will happen in the subsequent stage. 
In the second stage the countries vote on the Commission proposal in the Council. They 
compare it to the status quo. A qualified majority then approves the Commission proposal 
if a qualified majority prefers it to the status quo.  The set  CSi  of successful i-proposals 
under  the  consultation  procedure,  i.e.,  the  set  of i-policies  that  the  Commission  can 
successfully propose, is thus the set of i-policies that are preferred to the status quo by a 
qualified majority in the Council. 
10 Carrubba, Cliff and Craig Volden, (1996), "The Effect of Legislative Rules and Chamber 
Size on Vote Trading", Working Paper, Stanford University. 
Crombez,  Christophe,  (1996),  "Legislative Procedures  in  the  European  Community", 
British Journal of  Political Science, Vol. 26, pp. 199-228. 
Crombez,  Christophe,  (1997a),  "The Co-Decision Procedure  in  the  European  Union", 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. 
Crombez,  Christophe  (1997b),  "Policy  Making  and  Commission  Appointment  in  the 
European Union", Aussenwirtschaft, Forthcoming. 
Steunenberg,  Bernard,  (1994),  "Decision  Making  Under  Different  Institutional 
Arrangements:  Legislation by  the  European Community", Journal of  Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150/4, pp. 642-69. 
Tsebelis,  George,  (1994),  "The Power  of the  European  Parliament  as  a  Conditional 
Agenda Setter", American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, pp.  128-42. 
Tsebelis, George, (1997), "Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit", Aussenwirtschaft, 
Forthcoming. 
23 I  The consultation procedure accounts for about two thirds of  legislation (164 opinions in 
1995) and the co-decision procedure for about 15 percent (35 first readings in 1995). The 
cooperation procedure has become less important since the adoption of  the Treaty of 
Maastricht and is, therefore, not considered. It now accounts for about 10 percent of 
legislation ( 26 first readings in 1995). 
2 In general, I use the prefix i to refer to dimension i. 
3 The five largest countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) have 
two Commissioners each, the other countries have one each. 
4 The EU treaties do not specify how the  Commission President and the other 
Commissioners are appointed prior to the votes of  approval in the Council and the 
Parliament. I make specific, simplifying assumptions concerning the appointment of  a 
Commission. I reduce it to an up or down vote on a Commission President proposed by a 
country. The conclusions concentrate on the sets of  effective Commissions, successful 
proposals and sustainable logrolls. The specific assumptions do not alter these sets. 
5 In other words Black's median voter theorem applies (Black 1958). 
6 France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; Spain 8; Belgium, 
Greece,  Portugal and the  Netherlands  5  each;  Austria and  Sweden 4  each;  Denmark, 
Finland and Ireland 3 each; and Luxembourg 2. 
7 In reality, the Parliament can issue an opinion on the Commission proposal and the 
countries can unanimously amend the Commission proposal. I do not consider these 
opinions and amendments. The Parliament's opinions are non-binding. Therefore, they do 
not affect the equilibrium EU policy in a complete information model. Amendments by a 
unanimous Council are unlikely, since it is unlikely that the Council unanimously prefers 
an i-policy to the Commission's proposal. This would require that all countries have an 
ideal i-policy to the right (left) of  the Commission's ideal i-policy. 
8 In reality, a Conciliation Committee consisting of  representatives of  the Parliament and 
the countries can negotiate a joint text. The treaties provide for a reversion policy in case 
of  a disagreement in the Conciliation Committee. As a result, the assumption that the 
Parliament proposes the joint text does not affect the equilibrium EU policy. In 
24 equilibrium the Commission determines the reversion policy by making a proposal that 
cannot be amended in the Conciliation Committee. 
9 As a result, the Commission has no particular policy expertise. One could argue that the 
Commission has incentives to develop such expertise, much like congressional 
committees do in the United States. This could be studied in incomplete information 
extensions of  the model. 
10 In reality the countries and the Parliament do not know exactly what issues they will be 
dealing with over a period offive years. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that 
they have a good idea of  the main issues that will arise, and that they have these issues in 
mind when appointing a Commission. 
11  Tsebelis (1997) presents an alternative analysis ofthe co-decision procedure. He 
focuses on the last stages of  the procedure and concludes that the Parliament's powers are 
generally less important under the co-decision procedure than under the cooperation 
procedure. 
12 In fact, the countries and the Parliament voe on a Commission President. I assumed that 
the Commission President subsequently appoints the other Commissioners. He then 
makes sure that the i-median Commissioner's ideal i-policy is equal to his own ideal i-
policy on each dimension i. Voting on a Commission President is thus equivalent to 
voting on a Commission. As mentioned above, this specific assumption does not affect 
the conclusions in terms of  sets of  successful proposals, effective Commissions and 
sustainable logrolls. 












































no joint text 
rej ect proposal 
.'" 
status quo 
rej ect proposal 
status quo 
3 ..  !'  j  • 
.  .... 
q 
0  .-
(/)  -- q  <~  Q) 
S  N  .-
'"d 
--






















bO  <~ 
.~ 
~ Figure 5:  Consultation and Successful Proposals. 
co-
hesion 
A  P 2  b  - • 





Parliament •  •  North (10) 
T ····•··············································· ......................................... . 




2  A  1  A  1  Pa  Pb 
•  UK (10) 
market liberalization 
5 <I  I·  I  .. 
.  ..... 
~ 
0  .,..... 
U)  ...... 
~  <~  Q) 







<~  0 
•  ,.....j  N 
r.n 
•  ,.....j 
U  .- Co)  ...... 
~ 
<~ 
I;..)  Q  ~ 
I 
0  ......  U  U 
.......  .....  S  <~  •  • 
\0 
C)  .......  H  ...... 
~  ~  <~  bJ) 
•  ,.....j 
~ Figure 7: Co-Decision and Succcessful Proposals. 
co-
hesion 
A2i  • 
Ph  South (31) 
2Pa2














Parliament  • 
• 
u 
•  North (10) 
Core (36) 
Pal  2n I  pI  ra  b 
•  UK (10) 









•  Parliament 
u 
• 





2Pal  Pbl 
•  UK (10) 
market liberalization 
9 
) 